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CONTRACTUAL CHOICE*
THOMAS D. CROCKER* *

ON FREE LUNCHES AND FREE MARKETS
Even in its most general and sophisticated form, economic theory
postulates the existence of markets in which claims to all placemarked and time-dated commodities, contingent and uncontingent,
can be exchanged.' That is, markets exist for claims on all goods, in all
futures, and at all places. It then follows that any economic agent
given its initial endowments, will select one consumption, production,
and exchange plan to which it will adhere under all states of nature,
for all time, and at all places. Voluntarily chosen predestination from
here to Kingdom Come is the fate to which every economic agent
subscribes.
The logic of these conclusions is impeccable and is even intuitively
reasonable if one assumes, except for unexpurgable randomness, all
information is costlessly available to all economic agents, that no
scarce resources are employed in identifying and acting upon
exchange possibilities, and that once accepted, all obligations are
scrupulously observed. In short, if markets are free, then, at least for
living generations, there is no conceivable adjustment of exchange,
production, or consumption possibilities that could make everybody
feel they were better off or at least no worse off. Given a few weak
additional assumptions, it can be shown that an economic system
employing no more than market prices as allocation instruments will:
(1) generate all the information necessary and sufficient for the
coordination of all economic agents' production, consumption, and
exchange plans; and (2) provide the incentives for each agent to
behave in a manner consistent with maximization of the aggregate
value of all agents' activities.
The net benefits of the analytical simplifications flowing from
economists' revealed preference for the fiction of free markets have
been substantial. A powerful analytical engine has been constructed
that is capable of explaining a wide range of real phenomena.
Nevertheless, a price has been paid. On the one hand, the assumption
that the act of assigning resources to their highest valued uses is
costless makes the economic decision problem appear economically
*R. J. Anderson, Jr., W. W. Brown, and M. 0. Reynolds have provided helpful comments.
They correctly disclaim all responsibility for errors.
* Associate Professor,Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside.
1. See, e.g., K. Arrow and F. Hahn, General Competitive Analysis (1972).
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trivial. More important perhaps, the assumption of free markets is too
restrictive a mode of analysis for the study of institutions and their
associated structures of obligations.
If resources can be allocated at no cost, perfect efficiency becomes
identified with the equilibrium of a perfectly competitive market, a
conclusion that can make it difficult to comprehend the economic
basis for the pervasive voluntary adoption of nonmarket modes of
allocation. Since with costless allocation the price system that is
decentralized in terms of both information and authority can be
shown to lead to a perfectly efficient allocation of resources, the
existence of other institutions is logically viewed at best as redundant,
or worse, inefficient. 2 If Pareto-relevant losses in welfare exist due to
the presence of monopoly or externalities, they are instantaneously
eliminated by voluntary agreement. Interference by government is
unnecessary. The affected economic agents have an incentive to agree
to maximize their joint returns, since it can be shown that the returns
3
of each agent will be at least as great as prior to the agreement.
Costless allocation and externalities and monopoly are apparently
logical contradictions. If in arriving at policy judgments, one accepts
the existence of all three, he is justified in concluding at his whim that
the market "works" or does not "work." Any statement is consistent
with a logical contradiction.
More frequently, the identification of the results of allocation under
ubiquitous markets with perfect efficiency has led to a more subtle yet
still questionable procedure. In particular, when making prescriptive
statements economists have frequently used the results of the price
structure that would occur with ubiquitous markets as the highest
standard of efficiency against which, to compare the results of all
existing price structures. Thus, when drawing prescriptive conclusions
about monopolistic or externality phenomena, they strive to bring
about the results of the price structure associated with a world of
ubiquitous markets. 4 In effect, it is insisted that reality conform to a
2. No attempt will be made here to attach precise meanings to the intuitively obvious but
technically vague concepts of decentralization of information and authority. For a thorough
attempt to give precise meanings to the concepts, see Koopmans & Montias, On the Description
and Comparision of Economic Systems, in Comparision of Economic Systems 27 (Eckstein, ed.
1971).
3. Whether intended by its authors or not, much of the literature of the 1960's on
externalities has been interpreted in precisely this fashion. See, e. g., Whitcomb, Externalities
and Welfare 14-15 (1972). For an interesting exchange on Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality,
29 Economica 371 (1962), a major article whose analysis is frequently thought to coincide with
this view, see Shibata, Pareto-Optimality,Trade and the Pigovian Tax, 39 Economica 190 (1972),
and the reply from Buchanan & Stubblebine, Pareto Optimality and Gains from Trade: A
Comment, 39 Economica 203 (1972).
4. Thus, for example, when referring to benefit-cost analysis, Julius Margolis states:
The analyst tries to simulate a perfect and competitive market for the public
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state that is economically infeasible in most conceivable circumstances. This seems a rather incautious practice when many of the
processes governing voluntary choices among alternative allocation
modes and institutional forms appear to be prominent elements of the
economic behavior from which economic theory has typically abstracted. The practice has the potential and has in fact probably been
used to justify a substantial amount of collective interference in
voluntary choice among alternative forms of economic coordination.
To assert that a result is efficient because it is the outcome that
would occur with omnipresent markets after having initially made a
set of assumptions inexorably leading to the conclusion that a market
is the only form of economic cooperation that leads to efficient
outcomes is not very enlightening. If markets are in fact costly, this
sort of reasoning does not provide any obvious conclusions about the
efficiency of markets or any other institution as modes of allocation
and economic cooperation. When allocation is costly rather than free,
the ranking in efficiency terms of alternative modes in a particular
setting may no longer make the market the preferred mode. That is,
the market may not be the mode that would be voluntarily chosen. To
suggest that an allocation mode represented by nothing other than a
price established in a setting where information and authority is
highly decentralized will allocate resources in a welfare maximizing
manner even though private exchange terms in real allocation systems
embody a wide variety of conditional and absolute contractual
obligations is to neglect absolutely a wide variety of seemingly
important economic phenomena. The efficiency of any institutional
form depends not only on the manner in which it allocates its
resources but also on the opportunity costs of the resources it
consumes in carrying out this allocation. There exists more than one
degree of freedom with respect to institutional choice. The purpose of
this paper is to present a framework that is at least suggestive of one
manner in which the problem of choice among alternative allocation
modes might be introduced into economic analysis. 5
output, estimate the price which would have resulted, and accept this as the
shadow price.
See Margolis, Shadow Prices for Incorrect or Nonexistent Market Values, The Analysis and
Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, A Compendium of Papers submitted to the
Subcom. on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Com., Vol. I, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
533 (1969). It should be noted that Margolis does not subscribe to the procedure of the analyst to
whom he refers.
5. The problem of choice among alternative institutional forms has received increasing
attention in economics since the early 1960's. Decision and Organization, (McGuire & Radner
ed. 1972) is a good example of some of this work. However, from the middle 1930's to the early
1960's, R. H. Coase was apparently one of the few who thought the problem to be worthy of
analytical attention. Within the general analytical framework of preference rankings, endowments, production possibilities, and exchange possibilities, he was one of the few who did not
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THE COSTS OF COORDINATION
The reasons for the organization of economic activity by means
other than the decentralization of authority and information are
identical to the reasons why any economic activity is ever undertaken. There are expected gains that economic agents feel outweight
the expected costs.
Consider a collection of resource owners who are price takers in all
relevent economic modes of cooperation. Assume that these owners
are thinking about combining their resources to produce an output,
the returns from which they will share in some as yet still to be
decided fashion. For example, the owners may be perpetrators of and
sufferers from air pollution who are considering ways of allocating
the waste disposal abilities of the atmosphere. The method of
allocation itself is presumed to be a matter of indifference to the
owners; they evaluate alternative methods differently only because
different methods are thought to yield different results.
Whether the owners choose to coordinate their activities by means
of a multitude of bilateral exchanges or by means of a completely
centralized authority that acts as a residual claimant, 6 the owners
will incur costs in their attempts to coordinate their activities with
one another. No matter how skillful the owners are in coordinating
their activities, some positive amount of some valuable resource must
be expended on the coordination process itself.
Coordination costs represent the costs of making implementable
and actually implementing the terms of a joint enterprise, whether
that enterprise be a simple bilateral exchange or a corporation having
a legal life of its own. For our purposes, these costs do not include the
costs of information and search. It is assumed that the individual does
not face a choice between the discovery of more information about
enterprise possibilities and consequences and selection from among
the set of possibilities and consequences already known. He deals only
with the choice problem that exists given the a priori decision not to
allocate additional resources to search. This assumption is made in
part because, in the absence of knowledge about the consequences the
resource owner desires, it is not at all apparent exactly what it is that
implicitly view exchange possibilities as invariant with respect to institutional arrangements.
This is evident in Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937) and Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). One might justifiably argue-if one likes to
argue about such questions-that Coase's major and lasting contribution is his analytical
refurbishing of the economics of institutional design from the dustbin it had been relegated to
by the professional disrepute the Institutionalist School fell victim to after World War II.
6. The view of the central manager as a residual claimant originates with Knight. See Risb,
Uncertainty and Profit 280 (1965).
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constitutes "more" information.7 The distinction between search costs
and coordination costs can be further justified by recognizing the
difference between the completeness and the accuracy of flows of
information and the incentive to provide undistorted and unfiltered
information flows. Information accuracy and completeness can vary
independently of incentives if the costs of communication and search
are sensitive to different combinations and technologies of information inputs. Nevertheless, there is no particular reason to expect one
mode of coordination to have a comparative technological advantage
relative to another in the provision of information. However, alternative modes of coordination can have an advantage in providing joint
enterprise participants with the incentive to supply the valuable
resource of accurate and complete information. Establishing and
maintaining these incentives is a problem of coordination, not of
search.
Coordination costs are composed of the costs of arriving at an
agreement to undertake a joint enterprise and realizing the terms of
the agreement. They thus include the costs of higgling and haggling
about terms as well as the costs of monitoring the contributions of
resource owners and the rewards they receive. Coordination costs are
the costs of determining how rewards and costs will be assigned to
those resource owners responsible for changes in output in addition to
the costs of attempting to ensure that they are assigned in the agreed
upon manner.
As Alchian and Demsetz have argued, these costs of coordination
appear to take on their greatest significance when there are substantial interactive or nonseparable effects among resource owners. 8 That
is, each resource owner's contribution to enterprise output is not
independent of the contributions of other resource owners. Thus a
change in the resource contributions of any one owner can affect the
output that all other owners are responsible for even when their
resource contributions are unchanged. Exact assignment of rewards
according to the responsibility for enterprise output requires that
rewards be recalculated each time the contribution of one owner
changes. Unless a monitor is aware of the strategic decision rules of
7. See J. Marschak & R. Radner, Economic Theory of Teams 53-62 (1972) for development of
this point. It should also be noted that dismissal of the search problem avoids the severe
analytical difficulties caused by the introduction of nonconvexities, a feature of the world that
economists approach with some trepidation. The acquisition of information frequently involves
a fixed outlay that appears to be more or less independent of the scale of the enterprise in which
the information is to be employed.
8. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization 777 Am.
Econ. Rev. 62 (1972).
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the resource owners, a requirement that this exact assignment be
fulfilled would impose severe demands upon enterprise coordination.
Under these circumstances, some other indicator of owner output
responsibility involving measures of resource contributions under
specified conditions is likely to be adopted.
In spite of the difficulties that nonseparability introduces, it is not
the sole circumstance in which coordination costs can occur. Coordination costs are frequently high when the monitoring of the input
contributions in a production process or the good traded in an
exchange process is difficult. Many inputs are simply hard to count in
a manner that meets with the approval of all interested resource
owners. On the one hand, the informational content of the same
measure may differ among owners. Concentrations of an atmospheric
pollutant in the parts per billion may be highly meaningful to an
epidemiologist but nearly empty of substance to the lay person. The
extent to which the latter's vision is obscured is for him likely to be
more suggestive. Unless one can show each individual exactly how
vision and ambient concentrations are related, a common measure
cannot be defined independently of the things that each individual
values. The two measures are noncomparable. Even when a particular measure has the identical informational content across all
resource owners, coordination costs may still be introduced because
some owners derive particular advantage from one measure rather
than another measure of the same phenomenon. Consider, for
example, the recent tensions between American automobile manufacturers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency about emissions
sampling for automobiles. Since automobile engines typically generate more pollutants when they are cold, the time interval after
ignition over which emissions are averaged clearly makes a difference
in calculated average emissions. It is to the advantage of the
automobile manufacturers to find reasons for making this time
interval as long as possible. Establishment of a sampling time interval
that is mutually acceptable to EPA and to the manufacturers requires
that both parties expend resources.
As a means of coordination, prices alone appear to perform well
enough when resource contributions are easily ascertained and
reciprocated by rewards. For example, the spot exchange of two
currencies requires no statement of terms other than the exchange
ratio. When cardinally measurable, perfectly homogenous commodities such as currencies are exchanged, the parties to the enterprise
need only count the quantities exchanged to establish what they have
obtained. However, in the case of an enterprise like air pollution
control, for example, there can be harsh impediments to initially
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tracing the parties responsible for the air pollution, unraveling a
measure of what it is that is being called air pollution, 9 and finally
monitoring the contributions of each polluter. In these conditions
rules of evidence and procedure are likely to be established for all
participants in a joint enterprise. Contingencies will be specified and
appropriate responses will be stipulated. In short, a mode of
coordination other than the decentralized market in which observed
price is the sole coordinating device is likely to be adopted. Objective,
easily measured standards of performance will be embraced that may
not always be consistent with maximization of the value of output of
the joint enterprise under conditions where the coupling of output
responsibility and rewards poses only trivial measurement problems.
Thus an air pollution control agency might make rules about the type
of inputs a polluter can use or a university might employ numbers of
publications as the major indicator of faculty performance in both
research and teaching.
As Samuelson has shown, the sum of owner incomes in joint
enterprises where nonseparability is present will be maximized in a
world of costless coordination if and only if the marginal effect of an
activity upon an owner's income is equal to the marginal effect of that
same activity upon the sum of incomes of all other owners. 10 That is,
for total owner incomes to be maximized, the increase in the income
of an owner from an activity must not be less than the reduction in
the incomes of all other owners. In less obtuse language, this is simply
the familiar refrain requiring marginal private gain to be equal to
marginal private cost. The problem is the old one of making the
private optimum compatible with the collective optimum. In the
presence of nonseparability, a set of prices alone is not sufficient to
assure compatibility between private and collective optima. 11 As for
the separability case when, as we have earlier noted, there is no
consensus on standards for measuring the flow of resources among
owners, prices by themselves will again be insufficient.
In circumstances where there exist coordination costs, the economic problem can be viewed as one of finding a set of rules for
owner behavior such that the resource owner's costs and rewards are
made less dependent on his joint relation with the other resources
9. Comparisons of ambient air pollutant concentrations over time and space are utterly
fruitless unless the sampling procedures and conditions are fully specified. For an interesting
review of the many pitfalls, see Schneider, Sampling Problems in Air Pollution Analysis, 3
Environmental Research 452 (1970).
10. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Red. of Econ. and Stat., 387
(1954).
11. For formal proof, see Baumol & Fabian, Decomposition, Pricingfor Decentralization,and
External Economics, 11 Management Sci. 1 (1964).
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owners in the enterprise. The partial suppression of the price
mechanism reduces the incentive and the opportunity for participants
in the enterprise to maximize their rewards at the expense of their
fellows. The rewards of the resource owner from the production of the
enterprise are made at least in part independent of those of his
feasible activities that can impose costs upon his fellows. Separability
and common standards of measure are established. If each owner tries
to maximize his rewards subject to the constraints imposed by his
obligations, the expected value of the enterprise output is maximized,
given the owners' stock of information about the state of nature and
their utility functions. These obligations serve to make a group of
owners behave as if they were a team, i.e., as if they had common
objectives. Whether or not these obligations reduce uncertainty about
the state of nature, they do introduce regularity and coherence and
thus predictability about the behavior of all owners with respect to
each other. They define the limits within which owners and their
appointed custodians may operate without fear of retribution and
they permit owners to exercise greater control over future events. By
defining the activities owners may undertake 'with respect to property
objects, they also specify how owners must behave with respect to
each other. Contract obligations amount to specifications of acceptability conditions that serve to narrow down the range of possible
outcomes. In effect, the owners specify the conditions for a satisfactory outcome and mutually accept any realized outcome that meets
these conditions.
When confronted by a decentralized allocation mode in which
there are substantial coordination costs, the response of many
observers is to "internalize the externalities" by formation of a central
authority in whom effective property rights to the jointly used
resource would be vested. In addition to its possible alliterative
appeal, there is implicit in this response the recognition that the
central authority, whether it be a firm or a government bureau, and
the market are alternative institutions for the coordination of a
collection of resource owners. Within the market, each of the owners
acts autonomously, maximizing the value of his objective function
subject to the observed market prices that serve more or less
imperfectly to coordinate his actions with other resource owners.
Within the voluntarily joined firm, each of the owner's actions is
directed by central fiat, this authority being established by the mutual
agreement of the resource owners in order to maximize the values of
their individual objective functions. The authority strives to arrive at
agreements with resource owners that will serve to increase the
expected rewards of all owners who voluntarily submit to the
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direction of the authority. Since the authority is a residual claimant,
those entrepreneurs who hold the greatest promise in reducing
coordination costs by fostering owner collaboration will attain
competitive success. 12 Resource owners may on occasion voluntarily
relinquish at least part of their discretion about their use of their own
resources in order to reduce coordination costs and thus increase their
expected incomes above what they would be if the owners were to act
in an autarkic fashion. The market of economic theory texts and the
central authority constitute polar forms of voluntary coordination.
The choice between one form of coordination and another is
determined by which form yields the least inefficient set of activities
for the given set of resource owners.1 3
CHOICE AMONG FORMS OF COORDINATION
A framework suitable for representing the owner's choice among
alternative forms of coordination is presented in this section. It has
long been recognized that the attachment of various obligations to the
use of a good affects its observed market price. However, no one
seems to have presented a framework that explicitly introduces a
variety of obligations into a choice problem.
Any allocation mode or set of obligations is viewed as a specification of who has to obtain whose permission in order for the use of a
valuable entity to occur, the form the act of permission must assume,
and stipulations as to time, place, and conditions of use, exclusion, and
alienation. Given an individual's initial portfolio of obligations, he
must decide, given his opportunities, whether a voluntary change in
this portfolio will increase its value. The individual can voluntarily
commit himself to a wide variety of obligations ranging from
complete lifetime servitude to spot contracts that stipulate only the
state of the physical good to be exchanged. If exchange is costly and
if, in accordance with Lancaster, 14 every good that is exchanged
involves physical characteristics and legal obligations, every activity
then produces joint outputs. Furthermore, some of the same characteristics and obligations may be attached to more than one good.
An equilibrium means of coordination or institutional structure is
one in which a knowledge of the internal observable exchange price
for a valuable entity by the members of the institution is sufficient to
12. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretationof Social Cost, 38 Q. J. Econ. 582 (1924), and
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 8.
13. The veiw that obligations fostering coordination are voluntarily adopted by initially
atomistic, uncollectivized owners in order to exploit potential economic gains is certainly not
original. See, e.g., D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 436-59 (1961).
14. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74 J. Pol. Econ. 132 (1966).
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ensure that each individual member's optimum is compatible with
the collective optimum. That is, there is no desire by any one owner
who has committed his resources to the institution to alter the terms
of his contract. An adequate analysis of economic transformation
requires an explanation of individual owner choice among alternative
combinatons of obligations. It requires a framework capable of
explaining the complete "deal" that the owner will ask for and
provide. As economic theory has always recognized, if owner
activities can be costlessly coordinated, then this choice problem is
uninteresting in that the equilibrium combination of obligations must
always exist. We thus confine our attention to the case where
coordination is costly.
Given that the sovereign sees fit to establish and enforce some
positive degree obligations that apply to all individuals, voluntary
agreements among individuals about their mutual obligations can be
viewed as the establishment of a special set of property rights that
apply only to the parties to the agreementY5 A sovereign initially
designates the universally applicable property rights.' 6 Subsets of
individuals are permitted, however, to establish any kind of obligations within the framework of these universal obligations. Thus, even
if the universal framework is consistent with a structure that achieves
and polices cooperation by means of a multitude of bilateral sales, a
wide variety of alternative modes of cooperation is now permitted.
We limit our attention to the choice problem of the owner who
must decide upon the obligations he will be willing to ask for and
provide in order to join a given institution. That is, the owner must
decide which part of his portfolio of obligations to delegate to an
institution and which parts to retain for himself. If an owner values
self-discretion positively, he bears a cost whenever he foregoes
7
discretion about the use of a resource on which he has obligations.'
An equilibrium means of coordination is one in which the gains from
further owner discretion and further institutional discretion are equal.
15. "A contract between two parties, in proper form and for a legitimate object, constitutes,
as it were, a miniature statute." See L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law 71 (1968).
16. Discussion of the collective decision rnles employed to determine the nature and domain
of the universal obligations will be avoided in this paper. The 10th Amendment to the United
State Constitution makes clear the limits of our interest. "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Our attention is devoted to that residual left "to the people."
As the history of U. S. constitutional law demonstrates, the scope of this residual can at any one
time have rather furry and vague boundaries.
17. "Discretion" is used to refer to the owner's opportunity to specify the set of alternatives
he is willing to consider as well as his opportunity to choose from among a given set of
alternatives. Both of these uses of the term encompass the notion that the ownei has final
authority to make a decision. He cannot be reviewed and reversed by any other individual.
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"Mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" 18 will occur if and only if
the stipulations of the contract between the owner and the institution
do not reduce the present value of the income of either party.
Consider an owner faced with an array of institutions, each of
which offers him certain income expectations but requires he accept
certain obligations that involve giving up some self-discretion. Let the
owner's objective function be
i = l .. m
(i n IYi (pi -ri-YTi),
where I is the present value of the owner's expected income and Yi is
a resource composed of a unique combination of physical characteristics to which the owner is able to attach some realizable, albeit
possibly minute, obligations or claims. pi is the observable selling
price of the unique combination of objective physical characteristics
that defines the good and the obligations that are attached. The ri are
the costs of the inputs necessary to produce a unit of Yi and the Ti are
the costs of coordination, i.e., all costs borne by the owner net of the
costs of producing the unique combination of physical characteristics
represented by yi. It is assumed that the pi and the Ti are
determined independently of the ri.
In implicit form, Ti is defined as
(2)

Ti (zli, z2i,...
,zni ;y ) = 0,

j = 1...,n

where the Yi is introduced to account for the possibility that unit
coordination costs may differ according to the number of units of the
resource involved in the coordination effort. The z's are realizable
obligations that compose the owner's claim on the ith resource. They
specify-not necessarily exhaustively-what the owner can do with the
resource and what will happen to him if he fails to fulfill his
obligations. Thus, for example, if the means of transformation is the
air resource in a particular area and the owner is an emitter of air
pollutants, the z's might be obligations in agreements the emitter has
arrived at with other parties specifying the timing and character of
his emissions. We assume that each obligation can be described by a
unique index and that 3Ti/azii>0. Thus an obligation that brings a
deadline for installing pollution control equipment close to the
present can be treated as an increase in the obligation and measured
as the inverse of the time interval still available for meeting the
deadline.
18. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1246 (1968).
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Let there exist a relation
(3)
Pi = fi (Zijp Yi) '
where api/azi >0. Unlike the standard analysis, these observable Pi
need not be constant in a competitive market. Only the market value
of the combination of the pi and the contract obligations must be
constant.
A particular value of zij is arrived at in negotiations and ultimately
realized in reality by the application of a set of coordination inputs
that we will denote by xij v , where v = 1,..., q. Examples of coordination inputs are accounting systems and staffs, jails, office managers,
telephones, time studies experts, monitoring equipment, and all of
what might be termed the transactions industry. The following
implicit function is used to describe the transformation of the q
coordination inputs into a realizable obligation attached to a particular resource.
gi (xijv ,Zij' Yi)

(4)

=

0.

This is the production function that underlies (3). Henceforth it will
simply be denoted by gi" In effect, the owner is viewed as combining
coordination inputs and traditional inputs to produce a joint output of
realizable obligations and a resource having objective physical
characteristics.
Let the price of the vth coordination input be denoted by tv I The
owner's costs are then
(5)
ki = Yi ri + Yi Ti'
where
(6)

YiTi

=

(7)~~ =
(7)

11 =

I

I

xi
tv Xijv.

gi

Yi (Pi - id - V tv Xijv

+

ig'

Assuming that ri is invariant and that ar/ayi = 0, the first-order
conditions for maximizing (7) are
(8)

Vv;

O,

air

t + a.

aff

=YiaPi + xi ag

(9)

zi

azii

(10)

a
(10

- pi - ri + Xi

=0

V j;

azij

agi
ay
i

=0

Vi
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(11)

(1)

=g=O
- gi = 0.

air

Consider two coordination inputs, a and c, an abacus and a
computer. From the set of equations the general form of which is (8),
we obtain

ta

-

tc

gi/axiia

aXijc

-

agi/axijc

axija

This is similar to the standard decision rule regarding input prices and
marginal rates of input substitution. However, in this case, the
3gi/axijv involve more than the change in objective output quantity
with respect to a change in the (coordination) inputs. The changes in
the obligations the owner is prepared to assume are included as well.
Moving to the set of equations (9), we have
Y I

(13)

___

azij

i aziJ

=

or
-igij
X

a Pi

(14)

zi

YiaZij

19
It can be shown that
_

aPi

(15)

p

3Ti

T

-

azi

azij

19. Substituting (3) into (1), we have

nI= Yi Yi[fi(zijYi)-

ri -

Ti].

One of the first-order conditions for maximizing this expression is

=[a

az'ij i

0Ti

i

Lazij

- zij

=F00

or
api

_

a zij

aTi
azij

Another first-order condition is
an
I IaPi
n
ni =

i =

ari

Ti j~yi

aTi
Ti-

i-

ri

- Ti

0

ayi ] + Pi

that, upon the assumption that the marginal revenues and costs of producing the objective
physical output are constant, reduces to
pi

=

ri - Ti

+

yiaTi

ayi

NA TURA L RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

If marginal coordination costs are high and further attempts at
coordination contribute little or nothing to market price, some
obligations will not be adopted. That is, nonexhaustive stipulation of
obligations for all contingencies is possible.
Performing the obvious substitution, (9) becomes
(16)

aTi

= -Xiagi

azij

yiazij

Thus for two obligations, r and s, we can obtain the decision
(17)

api/azis
aPi/aZir

azir

azis

OTi/aZis

aTi/azir

=

-Zir

azis

That is, the marginal rate of transformation between the obligations
must be equal to their marginal rate of substitution, or, in pecuniary
terms, the ratio of marginal revenues from changes in obligations
must be equal to the ratio of marginal coordination costs.
Finally, from (10), we obtain
(18)

Pi -

ri

=

-ig

aYi
which can be written as 20
(19)

Pi - ri = Ti + YaT
aYi

ayi

This, given that contractual stipulations are held constant, is the
familiar marginal revenue equals marginal cost condition. However,
in this case it is the effect of changed provision of the objective
resource upon coordination costs and revenues that is of interest.
Assuming that each coordination input exhibits a diminishing
marginal product in realizable obligations and that the obligations
and the objective resource have decreasing returns to scale in the net
income maximizing combination of coordination inputs, the usual
second-order conditions will be fulfilled.
SOME IMPLICATIONS
At least some of the possibilities for extending the analysis of the
previous section are fairly obvious. For example, the introduction for
several owners of demand and supply relations for resources and
obligations would permit the simultaneous mutual determination of
observable price, combinations of obligations, and resource quantities.
20. Id.
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One can hold the number of resource owners fixed or permit entry
and one can analyze the comparative static effects of exogenously
induced changes in combinations of obligations. Some interesting
propositions might fall from these and other extensions. Nevertheless,
the heart of the analysis would remain the explanation of choice
among alternative modes of voluntary coordination as this choice is
expressed through owner decisions on combinations of obligations and
their relation to observable price. The remarks in this section will be
limited to some of the more obvious implications of the analysis of the
previous section and its plausible extensions.
Perhaps the most obvious implication that could be generated by a
modest extension of the previous analysis is that there is no such thing
as a universally preferable mode of economic coordination. Given
that coordination inputs are costly and that these costs differ among
resource owners and settings, a variety of efficient modes of coordination can exist simultaneously. The set of obligations that is voluntarily
chosen by an individual is dependent on the relative costs of
producing each realizable obligation. Equilibrium sets of obligations
are not exogenously given but are instead arrived at as an integral
part of the voluntary exchange process. To the extent then that an
exchange involves obligations, the observed exchange price of the
good is not an adequate indicator of the true exchange value. 2 ' This
point is as valid for objective physical inputs as for outputs. The
equation of observed price with marginal value product or marginal
cost is not even a necessary condition for efficiency.
The above propositions are relevant to the continuing discussion
about the economic propriety of alternative means of inhibiting
environmental degradation. Rather strong advocacy positions have
been taken up. The debate has concentrated upon the desirability of
market like effluent charges versus direct regulation where various
combinations of effluent standards, input controls, etc., are to be
employed. At least among economists, the effluent charge position has
been rather widely accepted, primarily because it is thought to
provide the greatest number of degrees of freedom for the effluent
perpetrator to choose a cost minimizing abatement procedure. For
example, Kneese and Bower state that "despite some shortcomings
and problems, the effluent charge approach is the one must likely to
result in efficient arrangements.- 2 2 Freeman and Haveman assert, "At
an abstract level the logic of the argument in favor of residuals
21. For empirical support of this statement, see Jesse & Johnson, An Analysis of Vegetable
Contracts,52 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 545 (1970).
22. Kneese & Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions, 173
(1968).
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imcharges is impeccable. Even at the practical level of policy
23
plementation, the case for such a strategy is strong indeed."
It may very well be true in a wide variety of circumstances that
"the other alternative of reproducing the effects of a private market
by charging a price or fee to those who would use the common
property resource" 2 4 is in fact the economic mode of coordination. It
is an empirical question whether a charge or a fee will be by itself the
economic mode. The question cannot be settled by appealing to the
deduced attributes of economic outcomes in a world of costless
coordination. Furthermore, one is unaccustomed hearing economists
who usually think and prescribe in terms of a little bit less or a little
bit more make policy suggestions deduced from an imaginary world
that contains only two choices. One choice involves only market like
fees and (presumably) a fee simple absolute set of property obligations. The other posits a world in which there are only property
obligations and zero observed money prices. The debate about
effluent charges versus direct regulation has treated differences in
degree as if they were differences in kind. An effort to discover a
decision rule that is capable of pointing to the efficient combination
of contract or property right obligations and associated observable
money price in any given circumstance is perhaps more likely to yield
useful results. If coordination inputs are in fact costly and if these
costs differ among individuals, circumstances, and places, an insistence that the mode of coordination to be employed in environmental
quality situations always be the same is fundamentally no different
than insisting that all institutions in all situations be identically
organized.
In the absence of a decision rule capable of pointing to the efficient
combination of obligations and observable money price in any given
circumstance, economists might consider searching for those alterations in obligations that appear likely to lead to reductions in the costs
of coordination. However, if the alternative alterations are to be
evaluated by means of traditional benefit-cost analysis, the concerns of
this paper appear to raise some complications. The fundamental point
of the paper is that the value of an owner's claim to a valuable entity
is a function of the owner's realizable obligations. So-called externality problems can thus be viewed as deciding whether or not to alter
the domain of an owner's obligations about the use of a resource. As
earlier noted, most such alteration proposals also suggest the introduction of a central authority in whom the obligations removed from the
23. Freeman & Haveman, Residuals Chargesfor Pollution Control: A Policy Evaluation, 177
Science 322 (1972).
24. Id. at 323.

October 19731

CONTRACTUAL CHOICE

previous owners would be vested. Even if this central authority is
benevolent and is aware that a price structure corresponding to a
world of ubiquitous markets may not be efficient, it may still err if it
attempts to make its choices employing the price structure corresponding to a world where owner coordination costs are minimized.
This is because the set of obligations faced by the central authority
will usually differ substantially from the obligations faced by the other
owners if only because the authority is usually a government agency
that is not permitted directly to appropriate any pecuniary benefits.
Thus the costs of one activity relative to another will differ between
the authority and the other owners. Therefore if the authority is to act
as the embodiment of the other owners by choosing the set of
activities maximizing the combined value of the entity to these
owners, it must itself face a price structure given its own obligations
that will cause it to choose this set of activities. Use of the price
structure relevant to the other owners may cause it to choose an
inefficient set of activities.
Benefit-cost analysis as usually practiced cannot be expected to tell
the policy maker what to do. It cannot be treated as a means of
optimization. At best, it can do no more than provide the policy
maker some clarifying information on the consequences of his choices
for those whose price structure is represented in the analysis. Any
optimization must be performed by the policy maker with reference
to his own obligations. If an economic efficiency criterion is to be
employed in public policy making, "politics" cannot be separated
from economics.

